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)
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)
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and SEED PRODUCTS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
a Delaware corporation (formerly
In-Tec International (U.S.A.), Inc.),
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STATEMENT OF THE CAffE

In August of 1986, Respondent, Sharon Owen, through JohnsonBowles a local stockbroker, presented Certificates representing
Twenty Thousand (20,000) shares of common voting stock of In-Tec
International (U.S.A.), to Atlas Stock Transfer for transfer into
the name of Johnco - the nominee for Johnson-Bowles Company so
that a sale could be effected pursuant to Rule 144 of the Securities
and Exchange Commission.
Sharon Owen was notified that the Company (In-Tec) had placed
a stop transfer on the shares claiming int^er-alia that Ms. Owen
was not the owner of the shares and had not paid for them and
further that Rule 144 had not been complied with.
Atlas, pursuant to Section 70A-8-401 et. seq., Utah Code
Annotated (1953 as amended) waited thirty (30) days for In-Tec
to either get a Court Order prohibiting the transfer or post a
bond.

When thirty (30) days passed, Atlas transferred the shares,

but because of the conflicting claims, filed the interpleader
action which is the current litigation.
Contrary to the Appellant's statement of the case (Appellant's
Brief at 5), the interpleader was not filed to determine "the
number of shares of In-Tec stock to which Sharon Owen was entitled",
but was filed only to determine ownership of the Twenty Thousand
(20,000) shares of In-Tec stock in the name of Johnco represented
by Certificates SL 0005916, SL 0005917 and SL 0005918.
The issue of the reverse split was not raised in the complaint

(1)

filed by Atlas, nor was it raised in the answer filed by any of
the defendants in the case.
In-Tec became Seed Products International during the pendency
of the litigation and installed new officers and directors.

This

new management raised the issue of the 20-1 reverse split for the
first time at the time of trial.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The District Court properly concluded, under principles of
Estoppel, that In-Tec could not assert its own failure to file
Articles of Amendment, as required by statute, for over six (6)
months after a reverse split had been approved by Shareholders of
In-Tec and given effect by the transfer agent of the Corporation,
as a basis for claiming that shares issued to Sharon Owen after
the meeting approving the reverse split were subject to the reverse
split.
ARGUMENT
The Trial Court correctly held that the Twenty Thousand
(20,000) shares of In-Tec stock issued to Sharon Owen on August 9,
1984, were not subject to the 20-1 reverse split of shares approved
by Shareholders of In-Tec on June 18, 1984.
The sole question presented by this appeal is whether or not
the Twenty Thousand (20,000) shares of Seed Products stock which
the Trial Court held was owned * by Sharon Owen, which shares

1

The Trial Court held that Sharon Owen was the owner of the
Twenty Thousand (20,000) shares of In-Tec stock represented

(2)

were authorized to be issued to Sharon Owen by the In-Tec Board
of Directors on July 11, 1984, are subject to a 20-1 reverse split
which reverse split was approved by Shareholders of In-Tec June 18,
1984, some three and one-half (3i) weeks prior to the Board action
authorizing issuance of shares to Sharon Owen.
The facts necessary to a determination of the legal issues in
this matter are not in dispute.

These facts are as set forth in

Appellant's Statement of Facts with the following additions:
1.

The actions of the Shareholders on June 18, 1984, when

the reverse split was authorized, authorized the reverse split
of only the shares which were issued and outstanding at that
time (See Ex. 13).
2.

Atlas Stock Transfer, the agent o£ the Corporation, gave

effect to the reverse split effective June 18, 1984, and reversed
the outstanding shares of the Corporation, being the total of the
issued and outstanding shares of the Corporation on that date and
the exact number which the Shareholders had authorized to be reversed,
on the transfer and registrar records of the Corporation as of
that date.
Appellants argued that since the officers of the Corporation

1 (Continued)
by Certificates SL 0005916, SL 0005917 and SL 0005918 in the
name of Johnco which shares were the subject matter of the
interpleader action. Seed Products (formerly In-Tec) has
not appealed the finding of the Trial Court that Sharon Owen
is the legal owner of said shares. The only finding of the
Court which was appealed was the question of whether the said
Twenty Thousand (20,000) shares were subject to the 20-1
reverse split, an issue which was not raised by Seed Products
until the time of trial.

(3)

failed to file the Articles of Amendment from the May and June
Shareholder's meetings until December, 1984, the shares of In-Tec
issued to Sharon Owen, which all parties involved in the transaction understood not to be subject to the reverse split, must
now be reverse split on a 20-1 basis.
The Trial Court correctly concluded that since the Corporation
had issued the shares in compromise and settlement of a debt owed
to Sharon Owen for services to the Corporation, and the intent of
the then existing Board of Directors was to issue post-split
shares, and the fact that the transfer agent issued post split
shares which were understood not to be subject to the split, the
Corporation could not now come into Court and be heard to claim
that since the Amendments were not filed with the State of Utah
(a situation caused by the Corporation's own negligent failure to
act) Sharon Owen's shares must be reverse split on a 20-1 basis.
Respondent does not dispute that the statute (16-10-59)
requires filing to make an Amendment effective.

Respondent's claim

is that the corporation is estopped to take advantage of its own
failure to act as a basis for reversing a long-standing position
taken by the Corporation, to-wit that the Owen shares were not
subject to reversal.
The cases cited by Appellant in its brief all involve situations
where the Corporation seeks the benefit of Board action in situations
where a filing with the state is necessary to authorize the Board
to act.

Such a situation is totally opposite to the situation

where estoppel is claimed to keep a corporation, which has for

(4)

some unknown reason failed to make the necessary state filings
to give effect to an act on which third parties have relied, from
claiming its own failure to file as required by law as a defense
to the claims of third persons who have acted in good faith on
the representation of the Corporation that its acts are effective.
Use of the legal doctrines of Estoppel in Pias and Quasi
Estoppel have long been recognized as precluding such a result as
sought by Appellant in this case.

I

The principle of Quasi Estoppel precludes a party from
asserting, to anothers disadvantage, a right inconsistent with a
position previously taken by him.

The doctrine requires consistency

of conduct when an inconsistency would cause injury to another.
It precludes a party from taking advantage of his own fraud or
wrongdoing.

See 30 C.J. S. Estoppel § 107.|

The principle of Quasi Estoppel requires no concealment of
existing facts and no reliance.

Its intent is to preclude a party

from asserting, to anothers disadvantage, a right inconsistent with
a position previously taken by him (in this case claiming the
issuance of shares to Sharon Owen is subject to a 20-1 reverse
split merely because the Corporation neglected to file Articles
of Amendment until December, 1984, when it had represented to everyone, including Sharon Owen, that the split had been effected June 18,
and she was getting post split shares).

See El Paso National

Bank v. S.W. Numismatic Inv. Group, Ltd., 548 S.W. 2d 942,948
(Tx. Civil App. 1977); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 251 S.e. 2d 441, 442,
296 N.C. 574 (1979); Jordan v. Jordan, 271 S.E. 2d 450, 246 Ga.
395 (1980).

(5)

Under the Doctrine of Quasi Estoppelf the regularity or
validity of an act cannot be questioned by those who are responsible
for itf and a person who prevents a thing from being done cannot
later avail himself of the non-performance.

Id.

See

Westinghouse

Electric Corp. v. Pacific Gas and Electric, 326 F.2d 575 (9th Cir.
1964).

In Rogers v. Hanson, 580 P.2nd 233, 234 (Utah 1978), this

court held that "Generally, one is not permitted in a Court of
Justice to take advantage of, or claim protection by reason of
his own fraud."
(1961).

See In Re Unger, 220 N.Y.S. 2d 93, 28 Misc. 2d 513

In the case of Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n.

v. William L. Pereira and Associates, 401 P.2d 439, 16 Utah 2d
365 (1965), this Court had an issue before it which was similar
to the present case.

The issue presented, as stated by the Court,

was:
,f

[W]hether a foreign corporation doing business
in Utah, which refuses or fails to comply with
our statutes, can claim an advantage by its noncompliance..." 401 P.2d at 441.
The Court held it could not and stated:
"The ancient and honored maxim that no one should
benefit from his own wrong is particularly
appropriate here."
The same reasoning applies in the present case.

Seed Products1

predecessor corporations clearly held out to the world that the
split had occurred prior to the settlement with Sharon Owen on
the monies owed to her.

It was the undisputed intent of the

Board of the Corporation to issue post-split shares for settlement
of the debt, and the transfer agent testified he did so. For
some unknown reason the Corporation refused or failed to file

(6)

Articles of Amendment with the Corporations Division prior to
issuing the shares.

Howeverf Sharon Owen relied on getting post-

split shares in making her settlement, and took such shares in
complete settlement of the debt owed by the Corporation.
reasoning in the Prudential Federal case controls.

The

New management

cannot, some three (3) years after the fact, take advantage of the
Corporation's failure to file to effectively reduce the value of
the settlement with Sharon Owen on a 20-1 basis.2
Appellants argue the statute is mandatory.

However, as stated

by this Court in Rice v. Granite School District, 456 P.2d 159,
162, 23 Utah 2d 22 (1969) "...estoppel may be found in the face
of a mandatory statute."
accepted.

This principle appears to be uniformly

See Crawford v. Thomas, 229 S.W. 2d 80 (Tex. 1950);

Green v. State, 193 So. 312 (Ala. 1940).

the Green case involved

a mandamus action to require the Mayor and Alderman of a small
town to canvas returns and declare and certify election results.
The election had been ordered by a probate judge pursuant to law.
It appeared that on the date set, the municipal election officers
did not appear and so the election was held by the Election
Inspectors as provided by law.

The Mayor and Alderman failed for

more than three (3) days to canvas the returns and declared the
result and take steps to certify the election to state authorities
as required by law to make the results official and binding under

2

In the case of In Re Unger, Supra, the New York Court stated:
One will not be allowed to bring about a condition by
his own willful fact and then to further serve his
purpose, be allowed to plead or take advantage of such
condition. 220 N.Y.S. 2d at 97.

(7)

state law (it appared the election would cost the Mayor and
Alderman their jobs by changing the form of government).
The ultimate question was whether by their inaction in failing
to comply with the statutory filings, the Mayor and Alderman could
bring about the result they wanted.

In holding this could not be

allowed the Court stated:
One will not be allowed
by his own willful act,
his purpose, be allowed
of such condition. 193

to bring about a condition
and then to further serve
to plead or take advantage
So. at 314.

By accepting the benefit of the settlement contract and issuing
Twenty Thousand (20,000) shares of In-Tec stock which everyone
represented and understood to not be subject to the 20-1 reverse,
Seed Products (formerly In-Tec) is estopped to question the validity of the shares even in the face of the Utah Statute § 16-10-59.
Quasi Estoppel applies to transactions where, as in this case,
it would be unconscionable

to allow a person to maintain a

position inconsistent with one he ratified or acquiesed in See
30 CJS Estoppel P. 589 N.66.50.

In McDonald v. LeNore, 540 P.2nd

671, 112 Ariz. 199 (1975) the Court stated:
Quasi Estoppel differs from other forms of estoppel
in that it appeals to the conscience of the Court
to prevent injustice by precluding a party from
asserting a right inconsistent with a position
previously taken by him. 540 P.2d at 674. See Evans
v. Idaho State Tax Comm., 540 P.2d 810, 812, 97 Ida.
148 (1975).
In the present case, to allow present management of the

3

The principle of Equitable Estoppel requires consistency of
position and conduct where inconsistency would work substantial
injury to the other party. United Contractors, Inc., v. United
Constuction Corporation, 187 So. 2d 695, 701 (Fla. 1966).

(8)

Corporation at this late date to take a position that the shares
issued to Sharon Owen subsequent to the Shareholder approved
reverse split and which were intended by the then Board of
Directors of the Corporation to not be subject to the reverse
split and which Sharon owen took in good faith reliance of their
being post split shares would be unconscienable and an open
invitation in the future to corporations to commit fraud by
failing to make timely Amendments to their Articles of Incorporation.
The failure to make the filing required by § 16-10-59 is solely
the responsibility of the Corporation.

Having failed to do so for

whatever reason, yet having represented to the world that the
split was effective, the Corporation cannot now be heard to deny
the validity of the Amendment based upon its own failure to file.
See Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n v. William L.
Pereira and Assoc., Supra; Green v. State; Grover v. G a m , 464
P.2d 598, 23 Utah 2d 441 (1970).
As a general principle, the evidence at trial "is reviewed
in a light most favorable to sustain the findings and judgment of
the trier of fact.

Rogers v. Hansen, Supra at 234.

In the present case, the Trial Court found the shares to not
be subject to the 20-1 reverse split and such result should be
upheld.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth hereinabove, the judgment of the
Trial Court should be affirmed.

(9)

DATED this QJ^

day of October, 1987.
BOTTUM & WELLS, P.C.

By:

(10)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies of
the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF were mailed this 20th day of
October, 1987, postage prepaid, to the following:
Elwood P. Powell
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
510 Clark Learning Building
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

M.
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